Model checker execution reports by Castano, R et al.
Model Checker Execution Reports
Rodrigo Castaño Victor Braberman Diego Garbervetsky Sebastian Uchitel*
Departamento de Computación, FCEyN, UBA, CONICET, Buenos Aires, Argentina.
*Computing Department, Imperial College London
{rcastano,diegog,vbraber,suchitel}@dc.uba.ar
Abstract—Software model checking constitutes an undecidable
problem and, as such, even an ideal tool will in some cases
fail to give a conclusive answer. In practice, software model
checkers fail often and usually do not provide any information
on what was effectively checked. The purpose of this work
is to provide a conceptual framing to extend software model
checkers in a way that allows users to access information about
incomplete checks. We characterize the information that model
checkers themselves can provide, in terms of analyzed traces,
i.e. sequences of statements, and safe cones, and present the
notion of execution reports (ERs), which we also formalize.
We instantiate these concepts for a family of techniques based
on Abstract Reachability Trees and implement the approach
using the software model checker CPAchecker. We evaluate our
approach empirically and provide examples to illustrate the ERs
produced and the information that can be extracted.
I. INTRODUCTION
Software model checking [18] constitutes an undecidable
problem and, as such, even an ideal tool will in some cases
fail to give a conclusive answer. But the limitations are also
practical. The vast state spaces can lead to the exhaustion of
system resources or impractically long execution times.
Software model checking has been making steady progress
during the past decade and today’s state-of-the-art software
model checkers can handle specific industrial problems par-
ticularly well. For instance SDV [1] is highly successful in
finding bugs in Windows device drivers.
Unfortunately, some instances take hours of computation,
only to inform the user that no counterexample was found
within the allotted time or memory limit. A user facing this
situation is confronted with several high-level questions about
what the verification attempt actually achieved. Should she
retry with a longer time limit? How much longer? Is the tool
making progress? Maybe she should try another technique?
Our goal is to extend and complement existing work on
partial verification by providing a different way for users to
observe the work performed by the software model checker.
An important step towards our goal is to be able to answer
much simpler inquiries about incomplete verification attempts.
We believe answering the following questions would be
valuable for a user after an inconclusive verification attempt:
• Can partial safety assurances about the system be extracted
from an incomplete verification attempt? For instance, a
user that receives a report showing that a whole class of
relevant behaviors has been exhaustively checked may use
this as part of a dependability case.
• Can behavior that was not analyzed be explored by a
user? For instance, a user that can observe that relevant
classes of behavior have not even been looked at by the
checker, let alone verified, may decide that what seemed
like a sufficiently thorough analysis is not such (e.g., an
inexperienced user would benefit from knowing that a tool
based on BMC with a fixed bound can sometimes give up
without ever exploring anything beyond an initialization
loop [19]). Moreover, a more experienced user attempting
full verification may decide that a drastic change in
the verification strategy is needed (e.g., another tool,
abstracting the system-under-verification, etc.).
In this paper we explore answering the first question using
the notion of safe cone. A safe cone is a finite trace for which
any extension has been analyzed in the incomplete verification
attempt. A minimal feasible safe cone represents compactly a
set of traces that have been successfully verified by the checker.
For the second question we build on the notion of a frontier.
A frontier trace is one that was analyzed by the checker but
none of its extensions were. Frontier traces represent compactly
classes of traces that were not explored by the checker. We
will see how ensuring traces are feasible plays a central role
in interpreting these results.
Our hypothesis is that execution reports that under-approx-
imate the set of minimal feasible safe cones and the set of
maximal feasible frontier traces can be computed efficiently
(with respect to the cost of verification) and can provide non-
trivial feedback on incomplete verification attempts.
We will start by illustrating with examples the information
we wish to extract and defining a possible formalization of the
idealized properties it should have. Subsequently, we define
and discuss execution reports (ERs), an under-approximation
of the ideal output. Afterwards, we instantiate these concepts
for the family of techniques based on Abstract Reachability
Trees (ART) [16]. We also briefly discuss a proof-of-concept
implementation built as an extension of CPAchecker [6] and
an empirical evaluation of our implementation.
We conclude this paper with a discussion of related work and
how our approach compares to existing techniques followed
by a few concluding remarks.
II. MOTIVATION: WHAT HAS AND HAS NOT BEEN
ANALYZED?
We frame our work in the context of a verification attempt
being interrupted before its completion.
Many verification techniques work by incrementally explor-
ing the state space. This is the case for software model checking
techniques like BMC [8], lazy predicate abstraction [16],
1 int min(int a[], int n) {
2 int res = a[0];
3 for (int i=0;i<n;++i)
4 if (a[i] < res) res = a[i];
5 return res;
6 }
7 void init_vector(int a[], int n) {
8 int i = 0;
9 for (i=0;i<n;++i) {
10 a[i] = nondet();
11 }
12 }
13 void test_min(int large) {
14 int n;
15 if (large) {
16 n = 20;
17 } else {




22 int min_elem = min(a, n);
23 assert(min_elem <= a[0]);
24 }
Figure 1: Harness for method min
inlining and unrolling based-techniques like Corral [20],
DSE [9] and, in general, ART-based implementations of various
techniques, including explicit value analysis [7] and CEGAR
variants of some of the previous among other.
In these techniques one can understand that incremental
exploration leads to an incremental but silent increase of
analyzed traces, i.e. sequences of statements, as depicted in
the examples that follow. In fact, some traces might reach a
fully verified portion of the behavior space, implicitly defining
a safe cone containing all possible extensions of such traces.
Understanding that partial explorations provide safety assur-
ances, we will discuss the frontiers defined by minimal safe
cone traces and maximal analyzed statement traces.
We illustrate these concepts with a verification attempt of
the instance in Figure 1 with bounded model checking.
Example 1 (Analyzed behaviors in BMC). The code snippet
in Figure 1 corresponds to a parametric test harness exercising
the method min. The harness input as well as the result of
method nondet are interpreted by the verification technique
as non-deterministic. Our verification attempt, in this example,
is not interrupted due to reaching a resource limit but instead
due to using a bounded model checker [8] with a bound on
the number of loop iterations set to 3.
Using this configuration, the tool would perform an exhaus-
tive exploration but would disregard any executions involving
the fourth loop iteration of the for-loop in init_vector.
Any sequence of statements reaching line 18 (n = 1;) will
necessarily satisfy the safety property, since the incomplete
verification attempt would not find any assertion failures and
the loop within init_vector can be exhaustively analyzed.
That means the sequence of statements consisting of lines 14
(int n;), 15 (if (large)) and 18 (n = 1;) defines a
safe cone, because every continuation of the statement trace
is also safe. The former is also minimal in that if the last
statement, line 18, were removed it would not be a safe cone.
Moreover, any execution that carries out line 9 (for (i=0;
i<n; ++i)) at most 4 times (3 full iterations and 1 bound
check) has also been analyzed. In contrast, any sequence
containing line 9 at least 5 times is ignored by BMC and
therefore will not be examined. Therefore, any trace exercising
line 9 5 times or more will not be considered analyzed. That
is, the trace composed of lines 14, 15, 16, 20, 21, 8 and then 4
repetitions of lines 9 (for (i=0;i<n;++i)) and 10 (a[i]
= nondet();) is a maximal analyzed trace. 4
We will now revisit these concepts from an entirely different
technique: lazy predicate abstraction [16].
Lazy predicate abstraction, the algorithm used by
BLAST [16], consists of two alternated phases. The first
phase generates, on-the-fly, a reachability tree whose nodes
correspond to vertices of the control flow automaton1 (CFA) of
the program. This process goes on until exhaustively exploring
the tree or until reaching a node that corresponds to an assertion
failure. Each node is associated with a predicate, initially true,
that must hold for any path reaching that node and prunes
some unreachable successors. When a node that represents
an error is reached, the second phase deals with analyzing
the potential counterexample to determine whether the path
reaching the error node is feasible. If the latter phase determines
the potential counterexample is infeasible, the tree is refined
by strengthening the predicates along the path so that the
spurious error node is pruned. Lastly, when a counterexample
is produced, it can be checked with a more precise analysis to
ensure its feasibility. However, if this additional check fails,
the search is abandoned.
Example 2 (Analyzed behaviors in lazy predicate abstraction).
The code presented in Figure 2, reproduced from the papers
presenting Conditional Model Checking [4], [5], contains a
non-linear safety property. As explained, the construction of
the reachability tree will reach the error node and the second
phase would attempt to verify the feasibility of the path leading
to it. The feasibility check is usually implemented by creating
a verification condition to be checked by an underlying SMT
solver and, therefore, inherits its limitations. In particular,
SMT solvers usually cannot handle non-linear arithmetic and,
instead, multiplication is modeled as an uninterpreted function.
Concretely, this loss of precision prevents the SMT solver from
proving infeasibility. The subsequent, more precise, check would
prove the path infeasible and stop exploration.
In this context, the following is a maximal analyzed trace:
lines 2 (int p = nondet();), 3 (if(p)), 8 (int x =
5;), 9 (int y = 6;) and 10 (int r = x * y;).
On the other hand, the then branch of the if-statement
can be successfully verified with this technique, since tracking
1A control flow automaton is similar to a control flow graph. Specifically,
nodes capture locations and edge labels are statements.
1 int main() {
2 int p = nondet();
3 if (p) {
4 int i;
5 for (i = 0; i < 1000000; i++);
6 assert(i >= 1000000);
7 } else {
8 int x = 5;
9 int y = 6;
10 int r = x * y;




Figure 2: Non-linear arithmetic. Reproduced from CMC papers [4],
[5].
the predicate i < 1000000 suffices to prove the assertion
always holds when execution leaves the for-loop.
The successful verification of the then branch would make
the trace composed of lines 2 (int p = nondet();), 3
(if (p)) and 4 (int i;) a safe cone. 4
III. EXECUTION REPORTS (ERS)
We now formally define ERs as an under-approximation of
the set of safe cones and frontier traces. These definitions
rely on two predicates (analyzed? and isSafeCone?) whose def-
inition depends greatly on the underlying verification technique
used in the incomplete verification attempt. Consequently, in
this section we only provide properties that predicates analyzed?
and isSafeCone? ought to satisfy. In the next section we ground
the definition of these predicates for ART based verification
techniques [16].
Examples 1 and 2 show how the notions of analyzed and
safe cone apply to diverse techniques. We will capture these
notions as predicates over traces in the following definitions.
Let the alphabet Σ contain all statements in a program,
making pi ∈ Σ∗ a sequence of statements.
Property 1. The predicate analyzed? : Σ∗ → Bool satisfies
the following property, where · stands for concatenation:
∀pi, pi′ ∈ Σ∗. ¬analyzed?(pi)→ ¬analyzed?(pi · pi′)
Property 1 aims to formalize the notion of incrementality that
we mentioned. Note that this property is logically equivalent
to its contrapositive, that is, analyzed?(pi ·pi′)→ analyzed?(pi),
as expected of an incremental exploration.
Property 2. The predicate isSafeCone? : Σ∗ → Bool
satisfies the following property:
∀pi, pi′ ∈ Σ∗. isSafeCone?(pi)→ isSafeCone?(pi · pi′)
Property 2 reflects our notion of safe cone as a trace reaching
a fully analyzed portion of the behavior space. Any trace
extension will necessarily also be a safe cone.
Property 3. The predicates isSafeCone? : Σ∗ → Bool and
analyzed? : Σ∗ → Bool satisfy the following property:
∀pi ∈ Σ∗. isSafeCone?(pi)→ analyzed?(pi)
Property 3 connects the two predicates, capturing how
isSafeCone?(pi) subsumes analyzed?(pi).
Definition 1. Given a trace pi ∈ Σ∗ and a program P , we
introduce the following predicate:
feasibleP(pi) holds iff there exists a concrete execution of
the program P that executes pi.
Given that we will always refer to a single program at a
time, the system-under-analysis, we will omit the subscript.
Property 4. Given ϕ : Σ∗ → Bool, a boolean predicate
that captures the safety property of interest, the predicate
analyzed? : Σ∗ → Bool satisfies the following property:
∀pi ∈ Σ∗. analyzed?(pi) ∧ feasible(pi)→ ϕ(pi)
Property 4 is at the core of interpreting analyzed traces
as providing safety assurances. This property also holds for
isSafeCone? due to Property 3. The predicate feasible(pi) in
the antecedent places the focus of safety assurances on feasible
traces, that is, actual behaviors of the system-under-analysis.
Recall that we provide properties that constrain analyzed?
and isSafeCone? but concrete definitions depend on the
underlying technique. We now define the set of safe cones and
frontier traces of an incomplete verification attempt.
Definition 2. The set Frontier is defined as follows:
Frontier = {pi · s|pi ∈ Σ∗, s ∈ Σ, analyzed?(pi) ∧
feasible(pi · s) ∧ ¬analyzed?(pi · s)}
Definition 3. The set SafeCone is defined as follows:
SafeCone = {pi · s|pi ∈ Σ∗, s ∈ Σ,¬isSafeCone?(pi) ∧
feasible(pi · s) ∧ isSafeCone?(pi · s)}
Definitions 3 and 2 are related to Properties 2 and 1
respectively, since the incrementality of the analysis is key to
the search for maximal analyzed traces, as in the set Frontier,
and minimal safe cone traces, as in SafeCone.
The set SafeCone can provide safety assurances about
the system, as in Example 2, where the then branch of the
if-statement has been fully verified.
Conversely, Frontier can suggest shortcomings in the
incomplete verification attempt. For instance, in Example 1,
the existence of a trace pi ∈ Frontier that did not even go
past the initialization loop suggests an important part of the
test harness was not sufficiently analyzed.
The conclusions obtained from inspecting both sets can help
assess the progress of an incomplete verification attempt.
We anticipated the intuitions captured by these definitions
in Examples 1 and 2, but there is one important consideration
that we omitted so far and only bring up now: feasibility.
Feasibility is relevant because, by definition, infeasible traces
do not correspond to system behaviors. Without feasibility
guarantees, interpreting each trace would require careful
analysis, because it could mislead a user into either increasing
or decreasing her confidence in the system-under-analysis.
Definition 4. An execution report is a tuple (S, F ) where
S ⊆ SafeCone and F ⊆ Frontier.
Figure 3: Architecture of ER generation.
Definition 4 defines ERs as under-approximations of the sets
SafeCone and Frontier, allowing empty sets as valid ERs.
The sets SafeCone and Frontier can grow quickly,
making it impractical to compute the full sets. Furthermore,
traces can be redundant, in a sense, if they only differ in a few
statements, making it sensible to under-approximate.
Fully characterizing these approximations might be too
restrictive, but some notion of adequacy seems necessary.
We opted for a relaxed notion of completeness. For both
sets, SafeCone and Frontier, we require that if a trace
pi ∈ SafeCone (resp. Frontier) ending in a specific location
l exists, then there exists pi′ ∈ S (resp. F ) and pi′ also ends in
l. This guarantee does not force extremely large sets of paths
to be reported and loosely resembles a notion of coverage. Our
algorithm guarantees this completeness criterion.
IV. REPORTS FOR ART-BASED IMPLEMENTATIONS
Throughout this section we will explain how we generate
ERs for ART-based [16] techniques.
ARTs constitute a relevant intermediate data structure used
in verification. The variety of techniques implemented using
ARTs makes them ideal for our proof-of-concept implemen-
tation. ART-based implementations comprise a wide range
of dissimilar techniques, encompassing lazy abstraction [16],
BMC [8], explicit value analysis [7] and CEGAR variants of
some of the previous [7], among other.
In order to explain how we generate ERs for ART-based
techniques, we first define analyzed? and isSafeCone? for these
techniques in subsection IV-A. Finally, in subsection IV-B we
will explain how we compute ERs from an earlier incomplete
verification attempt, taking the ART structure and the system-
under-verification as input, as depicted in Figure 3.
A. ARTs as Intermediate Data Structures
We have discussed how the concepts of analyzed and
safe cone, captured by predicates analyzed? and isSafeCone?
respectively, apply to example techniques. In this sub-section
we will instantiate these concepts to ARTs [16].
An ART is a tree whose nodes correspond to vertices of the
CFA and each node is associated to an element of an abstract
domain. For example, a lattice of predicates in BLAST.
ART-based algorithms consist of two phases, the first one
comprises an incremental generation of the ART and the second
phase involves a more thorough counterexample check.
For the purpose of stating which traces can be consid-
ered analyzed we can ignore the abstract domain elements
associated to each node. We can then think of an ART as
a tuple (G,W, q0,covered) where G = (S,Σ, δ) is a graph,
W ⊆ S represents a wait list, q0 ∈ S is the initial state,
covered : S → S captures subsumption between nodes, and
δ : S × Σ→ S is a transition function. The graph G captures
the structure of the partially built ART. W is the wait list
that contains elements to be analyzed in order to continue the
construction of the ART. The function covered is necessary to
represent subsumption between nodes but is not total. We say
that a node e is covered by e′ iff covered(e) = e′. Analogously,
we consider that a node e is not covered iff covered(e) is
undefined. Successors of a subsumed node e are not explored
because the state space captured by e is also represented by
covered(e). Hence, subsumption is relevant to defining which
parts of the state space to consider explored.
To make the definitions easier to read, we will assume the
following invariant holds for ARTs relative to covered:
Property 5. ∀e ∈ S. such that covered(e) is defined, then
covered(covered(e)) is not defined.
In ART-based algorithms, a node e covered by e′ need not
be further analyzed because any error state found from e will
also be found from e′. However, a sequence of statements that
reaches e might not be a safe trace if it is possible to reach an
assertion failure from e′. In other words, the sub-tree rooted in
e cannot be considered exhaustively built unless that is also the
case for the sub-tree rooted in e′. This observation is crucial
to define what can be regarded as analyzed or safe cone.
We will extend δ as δ′ : (S∪{None})×Σ→ S∪{None},
with None /∈ S to make it total and resolve the covered
function transparently as follows:
δ′(q, s) =

δ(q, s) if δ(q, s) is defined and
covered(δ(q, s)) is not
covered(δ(q, s)) if both δ(q, s) and
covered(δ(q, s)) are defined
None otherwise
Due to Property 5, δ′(q, pi) is never a covered node.
Moreover, we will adapt δ′ to traces with δˆ′ : S∪{None}×
Σ∗ → S ∪ {None} as follows:
Given q ∈ S ∪ {None}, s ∈ Σ and pi ∈ Σ∗:
δˆ′(q, s) = δ′(q, s)
δˆ′(q, s · pi) = δˆ′(δ′(q, s), pi)
We will consider that analyzed?(pi) holds for a trace pi iff
no prefix of pi reaches a node in W from the initial node.
Definition 5. We define analyzed? for ARTs as:
analyzed?(pi) iff ¬∃pi′ ∈ Σ∗.isPrefix(pi′, pi)∧δˆ′(q0, pi′) ∈W
Informally, we consider pi analyzed when no prefix of
pi reaches a state pending exploration, i.e. one in W . The
predicate analyzed? is clearly monotonic, satisfying Property 1:
¬analyzed?(pi) means there exists a prefix that reaches W ,
therefore any extension pi · pi′ will also share that prefix.
Similarly, we will consider that isSafeCone?(pi) holds for
a trace pi iff there exists a prefix of pi that leads, from the
initial node, to a sub-tree already exhaustively built. Intuitively,
a sub-tree is exhaustively built when none of its nodes are in
W , the set containing states pending exploration.
Definition 6. We define isSafeCone? for ARTs as:
isSafeCone?(pi) iff ∃pi′ ∈ Σ∗.isPrefix(pi′, pi)∧
δˆ′(q0, pi′) 6= None ∧ ∀pi′′ ∈ Σ∗.δˆ′(q0, pi′ · pi′′) /∈W
Analogously, the predicate isSafeCone? is monotonic, satis-
fying Property 2: isSafeCone?(pi) means there exists a prefix
from which W is unreachable and consequently any extension
pi · pi′ will also share that prefix.
B. Generating Reports for CPAchecker
We built a proof-of-concept implementation, on top of CPA-
checker, capable of generating ERs for ART-based techniques.
The input is an ART, without the abstract domain elements,
and the original system-under-analysis. Our output are the sets
S and F , composed of statement traces, generated by two
independent verification tasks, as shown in Figure 3.
Although it would be possible to evaluate the predicates as
stated in Definitions 5 and 6, CPAchecker already outputs a
pre-processed representation of the ART structure, collapsing
entirely verified sub-trees into a single node, and exports
the resulting graph [4], [5]. This way, we generate F by
performing successive reachability queries to ART nodes in
W and, similarly, to generate S the target nodes are those
resulting from the collapsed sub-trees. Informally, we augment
an existing ART-based algorithm by composing in parallel the
ART being built with the one taken as input.
We define the algorithm in terms of Configurable Software
Verification [6], formalizing how different reachability analyses
can be used. Due to space constraints we omit the details,
which are present in a technical report [10]. It is worth noting
that the algorithm used to generate an ER can be any ART-
based technique, regardless of what was used for the original
verification attempt.
V. EVALUATION
In this section we briefly comment the conclusions of a
preliminary evaluation we conducted. Due to space constraints
we omit the details, available in a technical report [10]. We
analyzed the performance of our proof-of-concept implementa-
tion with a set of standard benchmark instances. To conduct
the experiment, we first analyzed the instances with two
different techniques, lazy predicate abstraction and explicit
value analysis, and collected the ARTs at the moment of
reaching the 900 s time limit. Then we attempted to generate
ERs for each of the ART collected.
When using lazy predicate abstraction for verification, it
was possible to generate ERs within a fraction of the time
originally allotted for verification for the majority of instances.
Moreover, when using explicit value analysis, the set F could
also be generated within a fraction of the verification time in
most cases. Additionally, we manually inspected each of the
ERs and gained non-trivial insights in most instances.
VI. RELATED WORK
Conditional model checking [5] (CMC) is an approach
where model checkers are extended to produce results even
when the verification run could not be completed successfully.
The output, in its general form, is a condition under which the
program can be safely run. CPAchecker [6] instantiates CMC
by generating an assumption automaton, a machine-readable
encoding of the ART structure. We use this implementation
to produce the ERs. ERs introduce the notions of frontier
and safe cone to characterize the progress of an incomplete
verification attempt. The lack of any feasibility guarantees
in assumption automata has significant consequences. A user
might be misled by the size of the assumption automaton since
a vast automaton might correspond to a minuscule number of
concrete feasible executions and also the other way around.
We overcome this limitation by formally characterizing the
properties of our output and adding feasibility guarantees.
A slightly different approach [12], [11] to providing feedback
of partial verification results consists of a language extension
to be used to annotate assumptions made during verification.
This extension can be used to annotate the code and explicitly
state conditions under which the program is guaranteed to
run safely. These annotations are especially well-suited for
local assumptions, sometimes used during manual verification,
and for uniform assumptions, such as the absence of integer
overflows, which are not affected by the context in which they
occur. However, these annotations are not well-suited to state
assumptions made by some techniques, such as those based in
unrolling loops [12] or those tackled by assumption automata,
and as such, they are incomparable to our approach, which
can provide value in these cases. One of the use cases of
these annotations is to complement the verification efforts and
produce a small test suite. This idea of testing to complement
earlier verification efforts was later replicated [13] using
assumption automata as input.
A recent extension of the Dafny IDE [21], [11] provides, as
one of its many features, hints about parts of a specification
that might cause timeouts. However, given the modular nature
of the tool and the sort of specifications shown as examples,
the approach tackles a different problem than ours and the
feature might not be applicable in our setting.
There is also previous work on quantifying partial model
checker explorations based on usage profiles [22]. These
estimations are based on abstract models of behavior and
heavily depend on the provided usage profile. A similar
approach [15] works applying symbolic execution over the
source code of a system, without the need for an abstract
model, but in this case, the implementation requires finite
domains for all input variables, as well as a usage profile
for each of them. Reliability as they define it can be hard
to interpret and, once again, could be extremely sensitive to
the usage profile provided. Both techniques can be used in
conjunction with ours providing different value.
The modeling language Alloy [17] enables its users to specify
structural properties. An extension of the Alloy Analyzer [14]
highlights parts of the specification that are “problematic” or
“hard”, in the authors’ own words, by monitoring the activity of
variables and clauses in the underlying SAT solver. The output
is inherently heuristic, whereas our technique provides strong
guarantees backed by a formal definition of the properties of
the output. The ideas behind the Alloy Analyzer extension
could also be applied in conjunction with our techniques to
provide additional information.
Our work is heavily influenced by the ideas and tool support
of witness validation [3], [2], which we leverage as a machine-
readable representation of exploration progress. However, we
aim at enabling a richer manual interaction whereas that line
of work also attempts to increase tool automation and reduce
the need for manual inspection.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
Software model checking is already capable of handling
industrial instances and produce valuable results. However,
some instances still remain intractable for full verification. Our
work provides a different way to observe the progress of an
incomplete verification attempt: by means of an ER.
We formulated the concepts of analyzed and safe cone traces
and formalized the notion of ERs. We also implemented a
proof-of-concept implementation and conducted a preliminary
evaluation with standard benchmark instances.
We plan to explore ways to abstract the traces included in the
ERs for easier visualization and understanding. Furthermore,
we would define both existential and universal semantics for
abstract traces in the sense that a property applies to the some
or every concretization of these abstractions. For instance,
guaranteeing that every concretization has been analyzed, could
be useful and would pose interesting challenges. In a similar
line, to better assess the relevance of an element pi ∈ S, we
need to devise meaningful views and metrics of the possible
continuations of pi, e.g. coverage metrics of the cone defined
by pi.
We would also like to analyze how our technique performs
for a specific verification technique and varying time limits.
It would be desirable to conduct a user study to assess the
effectiveness of our approach once more competing output
representations become available.
We intend to look into alternative usages of our output. For
example, elements of an ER can be leveraged as additional
input to choose the right algorithm [23] to proceed after an
incomplete verification attempt.
As mentioned in Section II, the concepts we present are
also applicable to verification techniques beyond those already
implemented using ARTs: Corral, DSE, inlining or unrolling-
based, among other. It seems possible to adapt many of these
tools to produce similar intermediate representations, making
it possible to evaluate the generality of our approach.
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